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INTRODUCTION 
According to modern law-and-economics (“L&E”) orthodoxy, the 
primary—maybe even the only—legitimate justification for 
government regulation is to correct a market failure. This conclusion 
is based on two key assumptions. First, when markets are functioning 
 
 *  Wade H. and Dores M. McCree Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School.  
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reasonably well, they are better at achieving efficiency than the 
government is.1 Second, most markets function reasonably well most 
of the time. Although there is probably evidence to support these 
assumptions (for example, the relative prosperity of market-based 
economies in comparison with the relative poverty of centrally 
planned economies), both assumptions are usually taken as articles of 
faith by mainstream L&E scholars. This is why scholarly articles 
calling for a shift to government-owned means of production or 
government-provided goods and services are rare.2 
What remains for debate, then, are questions about which 
areas in the economy are characterized by market failure and, with 
respect to those areas, what sort of regulatory response is optimal. 
Brian Galle’s recent essay, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, is an 
excellent treatment of the latter question.3 It starts from the 
assumption that there are market failures to be fixed—externalities of 
one sort or another—and then focuses primarily on the optimal timing 
of regulation: whether regulation should generally take effect before 
the regulated actor’s conduct occurs (ex ante regulation) or after the 
conduct occurs (ex post regulation).4 More specifically, Galle argues 
that ex ante regulation has not been given its due, while ex post 
regulation has been oversold by some L&E scholars—including me!5 
I will have more to say about all of that shortly. But first let me 
say this: Galle’s essay is about more than upending what he calls “a 
developing consensus” in favor of ex post regulation.6 As with Galle’s 
 
 1.  The term “market failure” means something that prevents the market from achieving 
an efficient outcome. “Efficiency” in this context is synonymous with “Pareto optimality,” which 
is a state of affairs—an allocation of resources—from which no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off. Under conditions of perfect competition (i.e., the total 
absence of market failures), the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics demonstrates 
that any competitive equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, 
PUBLIC FINANCE 40–41 (8th ed. 2008). That a given allocation of resources is Pareto efficient does 
not mean that it is socially desirable. An efficient allocation of resources can be unjust because it 
results in unacceptable levels of poverty or inequality. To the extent government policy is 
designed primarily to help the poor or to reduce inequality, such justifications are generally not 
put in terms of market failures.  
 2.  One example of an exception is the context of healthcare. A single-payer system is not 
only supported by many serious healthcare economists in the US, it is the prevailing policy in 
many developed countries. See List of Countries with Universal Healthcare, TRUE COST, 
http://truecostblog.com/2009/08/09/countries-with-universal-healthcare-by-date/ 
[https://perma.cc/5M46-5X5A] (listing countries with single-payer healthcare systems as of 2013). 
 3.  Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2015). 
 4.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1723–24. 
 5.  Id. at 1719 n.20. 
 6.  The actual full quote is this: “My goal is to argue against the developing consensus 
favoring ex post incentives.” Id. at 1719. Notice that Galle uses the term “incentives” in this 
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scholarship generally,7 the essay provides a wide-ranging and 
thoughtful analysis of a whole slew of factors—economic, behavioral, 
political, you name it—that go into choosing the optimal regulatory 
instrument for a particular situation. Bottom line: the essay is well 
worth a careful read. What’s more, I agree with many of Galle’s 
arguments and conclusions. However, in the interest of scholarly 
debate, and in the interest of entertaining the reader, I will emphasize 
our areas of disagreement. 
In what follows I offer my own summary of the standard L&E 
account of how to choose the optimal policy response to a market 
failure. The picture of the consensus view on regulation that I paint is 
somewhat different from the one depicted in Galle’s essay. While I 
agree that there seems to be a consensus in favor of what I call 
“incentive-based” regulation—what Galle calls “pricing”8—there is, so 
far as I can tell, no consensus among scholars that ex post regulation 
is generally more efficient than ex ante regulation. Rather, there is at 
best an argument, which I and others have made, that ex post 
regulation has certain advantages when particular conditions are 
present; whereas, in other situations, ex ante regulation is better. 
And, in many situations, the optimal approach may include some of 
both.9 
I also address Galle’s three primary arguments against ex post 
regulation and in favor of ex ante regulation: the liquidity argument 
(sometimes called the “judgment-proof problem”), the myopia 
argument, and what I will call the multi-price argument. I conclude 
that these three arguments, at least the latter two, do not call into 
question the use of ex post, incentive-based regulation quite to the 
extent Galle suggests that they do. In fact, I argue that Galle’s multi-
price argument may actually strengthen the case for ex post 
regulation of a certain sort. 
 
quote, while he uses the more general term “regulation” in the title of the essay. As I explain 
below, his essay is really only about the incentives. 
 7.  See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice 
of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797 (2012). 
 8.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1717. (“It might surprise some readers to learn that for many 
scholars there is also a good degree of consensus on the best general approach to all these 
problems. That approach, in a word, is price.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Torts, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313,   
2335–43 (2009) (describing various circumstances in which less than “partially” optimizing ex 
ante agency-based regulation could be efficiently supplemented with tort law as a form of ex post 
regulation); Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue, & Michael S. Zamore, Smokers’ Compensation: 
Toward a Blueprint for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519, 528 
(1998) (noting that in certain contexts “command-and-control and performance-based regulation 
might be useful complements to an ex post incentive-based regime”).  
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I. IDENTIFYING MARKET FAILURES 
If regulation is appropriate only when there is a market 
failure, when exactly is that? For classical economists, the standard 
answer is when there is an externality of some sort. This occurs when 
there is an activity that produces costs or benefits not fully borne by 
the actor engaging in the activity.10 Think of the widget maker whose 
factory emits pollution that harms the environment in some way. 
Because the widget maker does not bear the cost that the pollution 
imposes on others (but instead bears only the small fraction of the 
total cost that the pollution imposes on her), she may invest too little 
in pollution reduction technology or, underestimating the marginal 
social cost of widgets, produce too many widgets. Or maybe she will do 
both: too little care in preventing pollution and too much production. 
(These are sometimes referred to, separately, as “care level” and 
“activity level” effects.)11 All of this can happen unless there is some 
form of government regulation that alters the widget maker’s 
incentives, that forces her to take into account the otherwise 
externalized social costs of her activity.12 
Markets also fail for reasons other than externalities. As 
behavioral researchers have documented for decades, human decision-
making often diverges from the models assumed by classical 
economists. People are not perfectly rational.13 People can be myopic.14 
They are innumerate.15 They give greater weight to losses than they 
give to gains of equal absolute value.16 They regularly exhibit 
 
 10.  See, e.g., ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 1, at 46 (defining externalities). 
 11.  STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21 (1987). 
 12.  This conclusion assumes of course that transaction costs prevent the market itself from 
correcting the externality on its own, through bargaining between victims and injurers. For a 
general discussion of the problem of transaction costs, see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 13.  For a highly readable and recent summary of the literature, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2012). For a summary of some of the implications of behavioral 
psychology for the economic analysis of law, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
 14.  See Jolls et al., supra note 13, at 1545 (“People also have bounded willpower; they can 
be tempted and are sometimes myopic.”); RICHARD THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 85–111 (2015) (discussing myopia in terms of lack of self-control). 
 15.  See generally JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (explaining and documenting innumeracy). 
 16.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
         
2016] EX POST REGULATION 101 
hindsight bias,17 confirmation bias,18 and optimism bias.19 Their 
decisions can be significantly affected by how their choices are 
framed,20 by what information is especially salient,21 and by their own 
particular habits of mental accounting for different categories of costs 
and benefits.22 In short, people do not always, or even most of the 
time, resemble the quintessential Homo economicus of classical 
economic lore. And that fact—as with the fact of externalities—can be 
a basis for doubting the efficiency of market outcomes in some settings 
and hence a justification for regulatory intervention.23 
The fact that externalities and cognitive biases call into 
question the efficiency of some market outcomes does not, of course, 
mean that we should get rid of markets altogether. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, no one seems to be arguing for switching to a 
centrally planned economy. Rather, there still seems to be a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of market-based decision-making over 
government-based decision-making that goes something like this: 
unless there is evidence presented suggesting that the externalities 
and cognitive biases affecting private actors are likely to be worse 
than the pathologies affecting government actors (such as interest-
group capture or cognitive biases on the part of regulators, who, it 
turns out, are people too), we should continue to rely primarily on the 
market to allocate resources.24 
 
 17.  See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXP. PSYCH. 288 (1975). 
 18.  See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175 (1998). 
 19.  See SHELLEY TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE 
HEALTHY MIND (1989). 
 20.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). 
 21.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
 22.  See THALER, supra note 15, at 56–83 (discussing framing effects).  
 23.  Some behavioral L&E scholars organize these various cognitive heuristics and biases 
into two general categories: “bounded rationality” and “bounded willpower.” Jolls et al., supra 
note 13, at 1476. There are numerous examples of laws that can be, and have been, justified on 
grounds of systematic biases in consumer decision-making—from consumer protection laws in 
many areas to professional licensing requirements to solvency requirements for financial 
institutions. To justify consumer protection laws, it is not enough to point out that consumers are 
uninformed about the consequences of the consumption choices they are making. Even markets 
comprised of poorly informed consumers can still produce efficient outcomes if consumers are not 
biased in their decision in one direction or the other. Hence the importance of evidence of 
systematic biases in human decision-making. Alan Scwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 630, 640 (1979). 
 24.  There are exceptions to this presumption in favor of markets. Many economists and 
policy analysts regard health care markets, for example, as different. See, e.g., Jill Horwitz & 
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Why does this presumption exist? Maybe it has to do with the 
fact that market competition tends to drive out decision-makers who 
are prone to mistakes or cognitive biases, and it does so in a way that 
government bureaucracies do not. This is a question that goes well 
beyond the scope of this essay. In any event, although a full defense of 
the market presumption is beyond the scope of this Response, it is 
clearly a presumption upon which much of L&E scholarship implicitly 
relies. It also forms the basis of the consensus in favor of incentive-
based regulation that, as mentioned, Galle acknowledges. 
II. OPTIMAL REGULATION 
The choice of an optimal policy response to any given market 
failure can be broken down along a number of dimensions; the two 
most important are the type of regulation and the timing of 
regulation.25 As to both dimensions, the primary issue involves the 
extent to which the regulatory instrument relies on market versus 
government decision-makers.26 
A. Choosing the Optimal Type of Regulation:  
Incentive-Based vs. Command-and-Control 
As to the issue of the type of regulation, there has long been a 
scholarly consensus in favor of what is sometimes called incentive-
based or price-based regulation.27 With this type of regulation, the 
regulator’s job is to determine the cost of the external harm or the 
value of the external benefit and then, in effect, to set the “price” for 
compliance (borne by either the government or the regulated entity, 
 
Helen Levy, Health Care Economics 101 and the Supreme Court, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 23, 
2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/05/23/health-care-economics-101-and-the-supreme-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/EZV5-FEZZ]. Because of the complex and inscrutable nature of the service 
being provided, we cannot presume that unregulated markets in medical care will lead to 
efficient outcomes. This is why we regulate who can practice medicine through strict licensure 
requirements, and why we regulate the provision of medical care in other ways. Many countries, 
of course, remove the market from medical decisions entirely through the adoption of single-
payer, government-provided health care.  
 25.  Other design elements to be considered include who the primary regulator should be 
(an agency or a court) and whether the regulation should be government initiated (e.g., SEC 
enforcement actions) or victim initiated (e.g., civil litigation). Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm 
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 361–64 (1984). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex 
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1263–81 (1998) (summarizing literature on 
incentive-based regulation). 
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depending on the type of externality) equal to that amount.28 This is 
done through some sort of tax (for negative externalities) or subsidy 
(for positive externalities).29 Why is there a scholarly consensus in 
favor of regulation by price in most situations?30 In comparison with 
other types of policy instruments, incentive-based regulation relies 
more heavily on market forces and private decision-making than do 
other types of regulation. 
To see this point, focus on the contrast between incentive-based 
regulation and so-called command-and-control regulation in the 
context of negative externalities. A command-and-control approach to 
regulation requires the regulator not only to determine the nature and 
extent of the negative externality caused by the activity in question, 
but also the precise regulatory response that is most efficient—that 
minimizes the negative externality at lowest cost to the externalizing 
party and to society generally.31 Thus, the command-and-control 
regulator must decide precisely how—which technologies to deploy—to 
reduce a given negative externality. This imposes an enormous 
informational burden on the regulator.32 For example, the regulator 
must know not only the amount and nature of the harm caused by the 
externality, but also the cost and efficacy of every possible approach to 
reducing that harm. 
With incentive-based regulation, by contrast, the regulator 
needs to know only the marginal social harm caused by the regulated 
 
 28.  This tax, sometimes referred to as a Pigouvian tax, is levied on each unit of output “in 
an amount just equal to the damage [that output] inflicts at the efficient level of output.” ROSEN 
& GAYER, supra note 1, at 82 (8th ed. 2008). 
 29.    
It might surprise some readers to learn that for many scholars there is also a good 
degree of consensus on the best general approach to all these problems. That 
approach, in a word, is price. Many scholars believe government should do its best to 
make sure that the price market actors face in making their decisions accurately 
reflects all the society-wide costs and benefits of those decisions. That accomplished, 
government should then step back and let the market work. 
Galle, supra note 3, at 1717. 
 30.  Below I discuss circumstances in which other types of regulation may be superior to 
incentive-based regulation. 
 31.  Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient 
Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 95 (1989) (describing command-and-control 
regulations an approach in which the “regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to 
comply with regulations”). 
 32.  Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1333, 1337 (1985) (“Such determinations impose massive information-gathering burdens on 
administrators, and provide a fertile ground for complex litigation in the form of massive 
adversary rulemaking proceedings and protracted judicial review.”). 
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party’s activity.33 The regulator does not need to know anything about 
the costs or benefits of alternative solutions to the externality. That 
information is in effect provided by the market. Going back to the 
widget-making-polluter example, once the regulator sets a price 
(through a tax or fine) to force the widget maker to internalize the 
otherwise externalized marginal social cost of its pollution, 
competition among widget makers (and between widget makers and 
other potential users of the widget makers’ resources) creates 
incentives for optimal investment in widget production and in the 
reduction of widget-factory pollution. And after the widget maker 
takes all cost-internalizing steps to respond to the incentive-based 
regulation, if widget purchasers are not willing to pay the higher cost-
internalized price for widgets, then widget makers will eventually get 
the signal, and widget factories will be converted to some non-widget-
making use that does not produce so much pollution or that produces 
more social value to offset its pollution. Or, if widget purchasers so 
love their widgets that they are willing to pay the cost-internalized 
price, thus allowing widget makers to continue making a profit, such a 
result implies that widget factories must be producing sufficient social 
benefits to justify their total social costs, including the pollution. 
A similar, almost symmetrical story can be told for incentive-
based subsidies of positive externalities. If some activity produces 
benefits to society that are not fully internalized by the decision-
maker, the regulator offers a monetary subsidy equal to the value of 
that external benefit. In such a case, once the beneficial externality 
has been internalized, the market can be relied upon34 to produce the 
most efficient overall outcome. So, for example, if businesses tend to 
underinvest in research and experimentation that benefit society 
generally, an ideally designed incentive would be set to approximate 
the marginal social benefit of each dollar invested in research and 
experimentation. And all of the specific choices about how best to 
respond to this new incentive—this new negative price for investing in 
R&D—would be left to the market. 
In sum, incentive-based regulation addresses market failures 
by forcing companies to internalize the cost (or the benefit) of a given 
externality and then allowing the “corrected” market to determine 
how resources will ultimately be allocated. Contrast this picture with 
 
 33.  This is not necessarily an easy thing to know. Recall, that the optimal regulatory tax 
must be set based on the marginal harm at the efficient level of production. See ROSEN & GAYER, 
supra note 1, at 82. 
 34.  When I say “can be relied upon,” it’s not that I, or anyone else, think markets are 
perfect. It is only that, in the absence of identified market failures, markets generally are 
thought to be better at allocating resources in society than government agencies. 
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a command-and-control, also sometimes referred to as “standard 
setting,” approach to regulating negative externalities.35 A command-
and-control regulator in effect replaces market-based decision-making 
entirely with government-based decision-making.36 For example, a 
command-and-control regulator in our widget-making example might 
require the widget manufacturer to install Technology X in all of its 
factories in order to minimize pollution in the most cost-justified 
manner. For such a regulatory mandate to be efficient, however, the 
regulator must take into account all of the relevant costs and benefits 
and determine that a given amount of investment in Technology X is 
the most efficient response to the pollution externality in question. To 
reach that conclusion, the regulator would need to know not only the 
social costs of widget manufacturing (which, as mentioned, the 
incentive-based regulator would also need to know), but also the costs 
and benefits of Technology X as well as the costs and benefits of every 
other alternative pollution reduction response, including other 
technological innovations as well as the response of simply reducing 
production. With incentive-based regulation, again, these 
determinations are made by the market though the interaction of 
supply and demand.37 
Just because command-and-control regulation is difficult to 
implement effectively and requires a great deal of information on the 
part of the regulator, however, does not mean that it is never the best 
regulatory instrument.38 To the contrary, there are plenty of situations 
in which specific regulatory mandates, despite the difficulty of getting 
them right, may be optimal. This is true, for example, when a 
regulator determines that certain actions are efficient for all or almost 
all regulated parties. Examples of this might include the requirement 
that all workplaces meet certain minimal safety standards (e.g., 
electrical wiring, sprinkler system, number of exits) or that all new 
automobiles come with certain safety features included (seatbelts and 
 
 35.  See Michael G. Faure, Environmental Regulation, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 452–53 (Bouckaert & De Geest eds, 2000).  
 36.  Id. (“When lawyers refer to standards, they usually refer to the regulatory measures, 
usually used and imposed by administrative agencies, that prescribe what measures a factory 
causing an externality should take to prevent harm.”). The classic article explaining the virtues 
of government set prices, via taxes, to regulate externalities, as compared with other types of 
regulatory control, is William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices 
for Protection of the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42 (1971). 
 37.  See Hanson & Logue, supra note 27, at 1264–65 (explaining the nature of and extent of 
the information that a regulator must have to do command-and-control regulation properly). 
 38.  Wallace E. Oates et al., The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of 
Environmental Standard Setting, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1233 (1989) (noting that incentive-based 
regulation is not always superior to command-and-control regulation). 
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airbags, for example). Likewise, it might be efficient to simply ban 
certain products that have been deemed too dangerous under any 
circumstances to be sold (e.g., metal tipped lawn darts, Bucky Balls, 
trans fats)39 or to ban certain activities considered too dangerous to be 
engaged in by anyone (riding a motorcycle without a helmet, 
discharging a firearm within the city limits)—or by anyone other than 
a licensed professional (law, medicine, structural engineering). As 
these examples illustrate, command-and-control regulation works 
especially well to provide a given “floor” of protection from certain 
negative externalities—or, in the case of positive externalities, a floor 
of investment in public goods.40 
The distinction I have been describing between incentive-based 
regulation and command-and-control regulation is, of course, a false 
dichotomy. Many types of regulation have elements of both. For 
example, cap-and-trade environmental regulation is often considered a 
type of incentive-based regulation because of its reliance on private 
markets to determine how best to reduce certain types of emissions. 
But cap-and-trade also has command-and-control elements, insofar as 
the environmental regulator must decide on the amount of the cap, a 
decision that requires just the type of information that a command-
and-control regulator would need. Moreover, incentive-based and 
command-and-control regulation can work together, for example, in 
the context of safety regulation. In some situations, it might make 
sense for the regulator to set a minimal floor of safety while the same 
or another regulator also imposes ex post fines or damages for harms 
caused. Indeed, such coordination of ex ante, command-and-control 
regulation and ex post, incentive-based sanctions can be seen in the 
context of prescription drug risks, where federal drug safety standards 
 
 39. GARY S. BECKER & RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCOMMON SENSE: ECONOMIC INSIGHTS, FROM 
MARRIAGE TO TERRORISM 139–42 (2009) (arguing that New York city’s ban of trans fat, the most 
extreme form of command-and-control mandate, is defensible on the ground that the harm of 
trans fat, in terms of health cost, clearly and greatly exceeds the social benefits). Lawn darts 
were banned in 1988 by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) because of their 
extreme riskiness. News Release, CPSC Votes Final Ban on Lawn Darts (Oct. 28, 1988), 
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/1988/CPSC-Votes-Final-Ban-On-Lawn-Darts/ 
[https://perma.cc/FD8V-DDEE]. More recently, the CPSC banned the sale of Buckyballs 
magnetic toys. Ian Simpson, CPSC Bans Sale of Buckyballs Magnetic Toys, Cites Hazard, 
REUTERS (July 25, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-buckyballs-
idUSBRE86O1LN20120725 [https://perma.cc/N7E7-EQ3D]. 
 40.  See Logue, supra note 9 (discussing agency command-and-control regulations in terms 
of floors). Government funding for public schools can be thought of as a sort of command-and-
control subsidy for K–12 education, where the government provides not only the subsidy but the 
rules about how the public good should be provided. By contrast, publicly funded school vouchers 
would be more of an incentive-based version of the subsidy.  
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are enforced ex ante by the Food and Drug Administration, and state 
products liability standards are enforced ex post by the courts.41 
B. Choosing the Optimal Timing of Regulation: Ex Ante vs. Ex Post 
In addition to the type of regulation, a choice must be made 
about timing. Ex ante regulation is implemented before the external 
harm or benefit actually happens, usually around the time that the 
important economic decisions are being made. Ex post regulation, by 
contrast, is implemented after the external harm or benefit happens, 
which can be months or years later. 
Consider the widget factory example again. Under an ex ante, 
incentive-based approach to regulating widget-factory pollution, the 
regulator must estimate how much harm each unit of widget 
production will cause in the future, discount that amount to account 
for both the probability that the harm will in fact occur (assuming 
there is some probabilistic element) and the passage of time, and then 
assess that tax against the polluter. Such ex ante cost-internalizing 
sanctions are sometimes referred to as “Pigouvian” taxes.42 Under the 
ex post version of this regulation, the regulator does nothing until the 
pollution actually causes harm—if it ever does—which could be years 
in the future. At that point, either the regulator determines who 
caused the harm and imposes a fine, or, characterizing tort law as 
regulation, a court does so at the behest of a complaining victim or 
class of victims. Either way, the polluter must pay the amount of the 
harm after the fact, and only if the harm occurs. 
Under either regime, the negative externality is efficiently 
internalized if everything works perfectly. Under the ex ante tax, the 
widget maker is forced to consider the external harm its product 
process causes, as she will in effect have to write a check to the 
regulator as each widget is produced. Under the ex post fine or 
damages approach, the regulation is somewhat less direct: the widget 
maker, knowing that if its production process causes harm to the 
environment it will be required to pay for that harm, is forced to 
consider those costs ex ante. Ideally the effects are exactly the same. 
 
 41.  This coordination requires a determination as to whether the federal regulatory 
standards will preempt state tort law. For a discussion of how that determination should be 
made from the perspective of choosing the optimal combination of policy instruments, see 
generally id.  
 42.  A Pigouvian tax, sometimes spelled “Pigovian” tax, is named after Nobel-winning 
economist Arthur C. Pigou, who is credited with the idea of cost-internalizing taxes. ROSEN & 
GAYER, supra note 1, at 82; Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1675 (defining Pigovian taxes); see also ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELFARE, 192–93 (4th ed.1932). 
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But the world is not ideal, and each approach has strengths and 
weaknesses. 
The strength of ex post approach is that it asks less of the 
government regulator. This is so in the following sense: the 
regulator—whether it is an agency or a court—must determine the 
extent of the harm caused by the regulated party’s activity only after 
the harm has occurred. This is the point in time when determining the 
amount and nature of the harm is presumably easiest; it is a task 
mostly of measurement and not of prediction. By contrast, the ex ante 
pollution regulator must make a guess about how much harm will 
happen, to whom, and when—not to mention choosing a discount rate, 
which can be controversial. This difference is what scholars mean 
when they say that ex post regulation has an “informational 
advantage” over ex ante regulation.43 
Note, however, that ex post regulation asks more of the 
regulated party than does ex ante regulation. Instead of relying upon 
the regulator to determine the appropriate regulation ex post, the 
regulated party must decide what to do ex ante. All regulation, in a 
sense, gets implemented ex ante when the relevant behavioral 
decisions are made. And under ex post regulation, while it is the 
regulator who will make regulatory decisions after the fact, it is the 
private market actors who must make the educated guesses ex ante 
about what the consequences of their actions will be, what steps to 
take to minimizes harms and maximize benefits, and so on. Not so, 
with ex ante government regulation, where the government agency 
must make ex ante predictions about future harms or benefits. 
III. RESPONDING TO GALLE’S ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF 
EX ANTE REGULATION 
The two primary advantages of ex ante regulation are, 
unsurprisingly, the two weaknesses of ex post regulation, at least in 
the context of negative externalities. These are the judgment-proof 
problem and the problem of unsophisticated (or biased) regulated 
parties. Galle uses both of these problems to argue against ex post 
regulation and in favor of ex ante regulation.44 In addition, Galle 
suggests a political economy argument for why ex post regulation may 
be inferior to ex ante regulation. This section addresses these three 
arguments in turn. 
 
 43.  See Galle, supra note 3, at 1728 n.58 (summarizing the relevant literature). 
 44.  See infra notes 45 and 48. 
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A. The Problem of Judgment-Proof Plaintiffs 
As many other scholars have done before (including me), Galle 
rightly points out that one serious problem with ex post regulation, 
whether in the form of fines or tort damages, is the so-called 
judgment-proof problem.45 Ex post, incentive-based regulation of 
negative externalities works only insofar as the regulated party has 
assets sufficient to cover the costs of whatever harm her activity might 
cause. To the extent the potential harm threatened by the regulated 
party’s activity exceeds that party’s assets, the difference will be 
externalized, despite the threat of ex post sanction. That is, the widget 
maker who faces the possibility of a $200 million fine for any harm her 
product causes, but who has only $30 million at stake in the business, 
will take into account the threat of the fine only to the extent of her 
$30 million of assets. In other words, the widget maker will 
externalize around $170 million of the risk that her activity creates. 
This phenomenon, sometimes called the judgment-proof problem 
(Galle calls it the “liquidity concern”),46 does not undermine the 
deterrence effects of ex ante fine in the same way, because such a fine 
can be much smaller, owing to the effects of probability discounting. 
Similarly, ex ante, command-and-control regulation does not succumb 
to the judgment-proof problem, as mandates can usually be enforced 
irrespective of the amount of size of the regulated party’s assets. 
To see this point, now let’s imagine that the widget-making 
process does not produce pollution, but that widgets themselves, when 
used by consumers, will on very rare occasions explode so violently as 
to cause death or serious bodily injuries to the consumer and to any 
unlucky bystanders. Specifically, assume that each widget sold poses a 
1 in 100,000 chance of producing a $10 million harm. Under an ex post 
liability regime, if such a harm occurs, the company will be required to 
pay $10 million in damages to the victims or their families. How the 
company will perceive this threat of liability depends on the value of 
the assets the company expects to own at the time the ex post sanction 
will be imposed. If the company expects to have $10 million or more in 
assets, it will ex ante perceive the threat of liability to constitute an 
expected cost of $100 (1/100,000 multiplied by $10 million). If, 
however, the company expects to have only $2 million in assets when 
 
 45.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1738–43 (discussing liquidity problem, which is another term for 
judgment-proof problem, and “limited liability companies,” which are a special case of the 
judgment-proof problem). Galle discusses some of my work on the judgment-proof problem at 
note 4 and notes 37–39, and again around notes 96–101.  
 46.  Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45–46 
(1986) (outlining the “judgment proof” problem); Galle, supra note 3, at 1738. 
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the damages are assessed, it will perceive the threat of liability to 
constitute an ex ante cost of only $20 (1/100,000 multiplied by $2 
million). This is what is meant by the judgment-proof problem. 
Contrast this scenario with the incentives created by an ex 
ante tax or fine of equivalent expected value. If a regulator, instead of 
imposing ex post liability, were to impose an ex ante tax of $100 on the 
company’s activity, the company would internalize the full $100 of 
social cost, even if the company the company has only $2 million in 
assets. Indeed, this will be true whatever amount of assets the 
company has, so long as that value, net of all other expenses, exceeds 
the amount of the tax. Thus, the ex ante fine/tax would be internalized 
despite the judgment-proof problem in a way that the ex post fine 
would not. 
Command-and-control regulation can work in such a judgment-
proof setting, for much the same reason. If the regulator decides that 
the company should make a per-unit investment of $75 in safety 
Technology Z to reduce the risk of harm caused by widgets, the 
regulator can simply command the company to do just that or else 
suffer a punitive penalty of $100 or $10,000 or an amount equal to all 
of the company’s profit—whatever is large enough to induce the 
additional safety investment. Such a command can work even if the 
$10 million of harm risked by the company’s activity exceeds the value 
of the company’s assets. 
These are good reasons to prefer either ex ante incentive-based 
regulation or ex ante command-and-control regulation to ex post 
regulation. Or, as discussed further below, they are reasons optimal 
regulation will often entail some of both—or even all three. 
B. The Problem of Unsophisticated and Cognitively  
Biased Regulated Parties 
In addition to the judgment-proof problem, ex ante regulation 
may be preferable to ex post regulation in settings where the regulator 
is likely: (a) to have better access to information about the future 
consequences of the regulated parties’ actions, (b) to know more about 
what steps the regulated party should take to maximize social benefits 
and minimize social harms, and (c) to be more likely to make rational 
decisions with all of that information. 
All three of these factors might apply if the regulated party is 
someone other than a sophisticated commercial actor operating in a 
competitive market. Consider, for example, Average Joe Driver or 
Mom-and-Pop Business Owners. These are individuals who, though 
their activities pose significant risks to others, are not fully aware of 
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the nature of magnitude of that risk. Or, they might not be fully 
informed of the ways in which they could minimize that risk. 
Average Joe, for example, drives a car which has the capacity 
at any moment to cause serious physical injuries or death to other 
drivers or pedestrians, as well as property damage to other cars. Joe is 
of course generally aware of these risks, but he may have no idea of 
the precise size of those risks or how much those risks can be affected 
by what seem like minor changes in his driving behavior. Similarly, 
Mom and Pop may be relatively good at their business—running a 
smallish, roadside hotel—but they may not fully understand the 
potential societal cost of their failure to invest in a modern fire-safety 
system with smoke and heat sensitive automatic sprinklers. 
By contrast, the regulatory authorities tasked with regulating 
auto safety and local fire codes likely have much better information 
about all of these factors. If that is true, then ex post regulation, which 
depends for its justification on the relative expertise of private parties 
compared with regulators, may not work as well as ex ante regulation, 
even if there is no judgment-proof problem. This is one reason we 
impose speed limits on drivers and command-and-control safety 
mandates on businesses. The threat of ex post sanctions for failing to 
drive reasonably or failing to install minimal safety measures in one’s 
place of business may not induce optimal care levels or activity levels, 
if the regulated parties simply do not know (and find it too costly to 
learn) what optimal behavior looks like, or if the regulated parties are 
more likely (than the regulator) to suffer from the sorts of cognitive 
biases discussed above, including myopia and optimism bias. 
It should be emphasized, however, that this relative 
information-cost/cognitive-bias story may favor ex post regulation over 
ex ante regulation in some situations. Specifically, when the regulated 
parties are sophisticated commercial entities that are likely to know 
more about the risks of their activities than the government does, and 
where those parties have sufficient assets sufficient to cover the risks 
they pose (neutralizing the judgment-proof problem). In these cases, 
there is a relatively strong case for ex post, incentive-based regulation, 
either alone or in combination with various forms of ex ante 
regulation. This might be true, for example, in the context of products 
liability as applied to large, consumer product manufacturers.47 
 
 47.  For an argument that big tobacco presents a relatively strong case for ex post incentive-
based regulation, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 27 at 1273–78. For a more general argument 
in favor of strict products liability, see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party 
Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
129, 164–70 (1990). 
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One of the more interesting arguments in Galle’s defense of ex 
ante regulation can be understood as a response to the argument just 
made. That is, Galle emphasizes a particular sort of myopia that can 
lead even large corporate entities, perhaps especially large corporate 
entities, to underestimate or systematically ignore the likelihood of an 
ex post sanction.48 It is well known that, because of the separation of 
ownership and control in such businesses, corporate managers can 
make decisions that are not necessarily in the best long-term interests 
of their shareholders.49 
As Galle points out, this type of agency problem can pose 
special problems in the context of ex post regulation if the corporate 
managers expect not to be around when the ex post sanction is 
imposed. In such a case, the managers have the same ex ante 
incentive to externalize the threat of that sanction as a much smaller 
regulated party—one who is judgment-proof or more prone to 
cognitive biases. This is indeed a serious limitation on ex post 
regulation and an argument for ex ante regulation, as even the myopic 
executive would find it difficult to ignore a direct regulatory command 
or an ex ante Pigouvian tax. Below in Part IV, I suggest how 
mandatory liability insurance might be a potential solution, and I 
address Galle’s concerns about this solution. 
C. The Political Economy Argument Against Ex Post Regulation: The 
Time-Inconsistency Problem 
Galle also identifies another potential problem with reliance on 
ex post regulation: some regulated parties are likely to lobby 
effectively to eliminate ex post sanctions before they can be imposed.50 
This concern, like the agency-problem concern, would apply primarily 
to large corporate regulated parties. While the government may adopt 
a policy of ex post sanctions with the best of intentions, when the time 
comes to impose those sanctions, the regulator may find it very 
difficult politically to carry through with this policy plan. As a result, 
the government’s initial commitment to impose ex post sanctions may 
not be credible, thus undermining the ex ante incentive effect of such 
a policy instrument.51 
 
 48.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1743–44. 
 49.  The classic citation for this point is Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, The 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 305 (1983). 
 50.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1734–36. 
 51.  Id. For a general discussion of the difficulties that governments often face in trying to 
make credible commitments to particular policy plans over time, see Finn E. Kydland & Edwin 
C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 
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One potential solution to this “time-inconsistency” problem, in 
the context of ex post regulation, is for the government to create a 
permanent, institutionalized, ex post compensation regime. Such a 
regime would resemble a workers’ compensation program or the 
federal vaccine compensation program—or, for that matter, a system 
similar to American products liability law52—all of which impose 
damages or taxes on the regulated parties after the fact to fund 
compensation payments to those harmed by the regulated activity.53 
The key to neutralizing the time-inconsistency problem is that the 
damages payments under such a regime must be assessed 
automatically upon a showing by the injured victim that he or she has 
been harmed, with no need for lawmakers to vote on additional 
appropriations. It is the opportunity to revisit the original choice of a 
“policy path” that creates the time-inconsistency problem. 
Adopting such a permanent compensation regime would not 
only eliminate the need for a new vote on potentially politically 
sensitive new taxes, it would also create a large and influential 
interest group that would counteract the political influence of the 
regulated parties. Indeed, the very fact that tort law, workers’ 
compensation law, and a number of other such 
compensation/regulatory regimes exist (and have not been eliminated 
despite the active lobbying of the regulated parties) suggests that this 
pre-commitment problem for ex post regulation highlighted by Galle 
may not be insuperable.54 
D. Galle’s Multi-Price Argument: Risk Classification by Another Name 
To my mind the most interesting argument that Galle makes in 
favor of ex ante regulation and against ex post regulation is what I 
call his multi-price argument, and it goes something like this: One of 
the purported advantages of ex post over ex ante, incentive-based 
 
473, 486–87 (1977). For a discussion of how this so-called time-inconsistency problem creates 
issues for legal transitions, see Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and 
the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1142–43 (1996). 
 52.  But see infra discussion about the possible administrative-cost advantages of the 
workers’ compensation approach compared with traditional tort law. 
 53.  Saul Levmore and I made essentially this same argument, in the context of terrorism 
compensation and crime arrangements, in Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against 
Terrorism—And Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 291–95 (2003).   
 54.  I agree with Galle, though, that reliance on ad hoc government compensation 
programs, such as FEMA disaster relief, can create non-optimal incentives. Galle, supra note 3, 
at 1736–37. Indeed, Omri Ben-Shahar and I have made precisely this argument. See generally 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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regulation is that the price set by the regulator is more likely to be 
accurate in the former case than in the latter. Again, the government 
regulator—whether it be an agency or a court—will have more 
information after the harm occurs and will reach a relatively more 
accurate assessment of individualized harm caused to the particular 
victims and by the particular injurers. By contrast, a regulator setting 
the price ex ante will typically lack the information necessary to set 
individualized prices. As a result, the best that the ex ante regulator 
can do is to set a single price for all regulated parties at a level that 
minimizes the sum of deadweight losses associated with the errors in 
measurement.55 
To see this point, consider a very simple example involving tort 
law. Imagine that a widget is a consumer product that poses a non-
trivial risk of harm (a very small likelihood of a very serious injury) to 
individuals who purchase and use it. Assume further that widgets can 
be designed several different ways and that some of the designs pose a 
greater risk of injury to widget users than others. Now, assume 
initially that a federal agency tasked with regulating widget-injury 
risks decides to implement an ex ante Pigouvian tax. Specifically, the 
agency opts to impose on widget makers a per-unit tax equal to the 
social marginal external harm associated with widgets. Because of 
information constraints, however, assume for now that the regulator 
is only able to determine the average per unit injury risk of widgets. 
As a result, the most accurate ex ante Pigouvian tax the regulator can 
manage is one that is equal to the mean of per-unit social harm 
associated with all widgets in the market. 
The problem with this industry-average ex ante Pigouvian tax 
is the inevitable over- and under-pricing. For widget makers selling 
safer-than-average widgets, the industry-average tax is too high; for 
those selling riskier-than-average widgets, the industry-average tax is 
too low. The resulting errors of both types produce deadweight loss, in 
the sense that some people are overpaying for unsafe widgets and 
underpaying for safe ones.56 This disparity also creates inefficient 
incentives for widget makers, as the sellers of relatively safe widgets 
are induced by the industry-average tax to cut spending on safety, 
 
 55.  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1253–
56 (2001).  
 56.  The two types of errors do not offset each other. Likewise, if the weather outside is way 
too hot in the day and way too cold at night, one does not conclude that, because the average 
temperature was moderate, the weather overall was pleasant.  
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thereby externalizing the extra widget risk onto the other 
manufacturers paying the tax.57 
If we put to one side the judgment-proof and biased-regulated-
party problems discussed above, an ex post system of regulation, in 
theory, solves the mispricing problem caused by an industry-average 
tax. If we assume that each widget maker will be held liable ex post 
for the injuries caused by its particular widgets, all widget makers, 
foreseeing that possibility, will have an incentive to invest in cost-
effective safety enhancements, since they will reap the full reward of 
such expenditures through the lower expected costs of ex post damage 
claims. Meanwhile, widget makers who skimp on safety will be 
punished. For the same reason, the optimal number of widgets will be 
purchased, as the price of each widget will reflect its full expected ex 
post liability cost. 
Not so fast, Galle says. Besides the fact that the judgment-
proof problem and myopic-regulated-parties do exist, the ex ante 
regulator is not necessarily limited to a single industry-average price. 
If the ex ante regulator has just a little more information, it can 
organize the regulated parties into a few groups (or “clusters,” to use 
Galle’s term) based on their risk-relevant characteristics and then set 
group-based or cluster-based prices/taxes.58 By doing so, the regulator 
can reduce the sum of overall deadweight losses from the regulated 
activity. As Galle puts it: 
[F]or each individual, the deadweight loss caused by government mispricing is a 
function of the distance between the price that individual faces and the marginal social 
benefit of correcting the externality. Under multiple prices, the government can in effect 
divide up the population and assign members to the price that is closest to them, 
thereby diminishing deadweight loss.59 
Galle makes the point several different ways, including 
mathematically.60 But you can see the basic point through my simple 
example. Instead of charging the same Pigouvian price to all widget 
makers, imagine that the ex ante regulator is able to group all widget 
makers into, say, three categories, based on the safety of their widget 
designs: the makers of “very safe” widgets, the makers of “moderately 
safe” widgets, and the makers of “borderline unsafe widgets.” The 
 
 57.  Indeed, if this hypothetical ex ante widget tax were continually updated based entirely 
on the means of all widgets, adverse selection would create a tendency for all widget makers 
eventually to cut spending on safety, and the market for safe widgets would begin to unravel. 
There may be a limit to the unraveling, assuming consumers have some ability to perceive the 
riskiness of widgets. Put differently, consumers’ demand for, and ability to perceive, the safety in 
their widgets might serve as the floor in terms of how far safety unraveling might go. 
 58.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1730. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 1731 n.68. 
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member of each group would then be charged the (otherwise 
externalized) mean per-unit widget risk for that group. 
There would still be some variance within each group, and thus 
some over- and under-charging. But if the risk clusters or risk groups 
are accurately assembled, the sum of the errors within each group 
(and the size of the resulting safety disincentive) would be less than 
the sum of the errors (and safety disincentive) under the industry-
wide single tax. If, however, it is difficult for the regulator to sort the 
widget makers into the appropriate risk group, and easy for the 
widget makers to misrepresent which group they belong in, there 
would be a problem. If lots of borderline-unsafe widget makers are 
taxed as if they were very-safe widget makers, then segregating all of 
the widget makers into these risk groups could actually make matters 
worse, increasing rather than decreasing the total over- and under-
pricing. Putting that distressing possibility to one side, if we are 
willing to let ex ante regulators set more than one price based on 
clusters of regulated parties, Galle argues, ex ante incentive-based 
regulation can at least in theory be more efficient than people have 
recognized.61 
Further, Galle argues that the tendency of some forms of ex 
post regulation to create fully individualized incentives for each 
regulated party, as described in the hypothetical above, may also not 
be optimal.62 For example, the tort system—with its long, expensive 
discovery process, its complex trials with additional live testimony, 
and its ultimate jury determination, all designed to determine the 
precisely accurate ex post sanction in each case—may be inefficiently 
“overinvesting in precision.”63 What is needed, Galle seems to be 
arguing, is incentive-based regulation that imposes multiple prices on 
regulated parties but not too many prices.64 
Note, however, that there are countervailing forces that push 
in the direction of using more individualized ex post prices than 
Galle’s argument implies. Specifically, there are efficiency advantages 
(that Galle ignores) associated with an ex post regulatory regime that 
not only creates ex ante regulatory incentives but also serves to 
 
 61.  Id. at 1720–21; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 55. 
 62.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1734 (“Infinite price flexibility” may not be optimal “especially in 
a world with some observational error. With more price categories, it is easier for the 
government to mistakenly assign a producer to the wrong price point.”). 
 63.  Id. (“Regimes such as the tort system, which are built to match price exactly to each 
defendant, may be wastefully over-investing in precision.”). 
 64.  Id. at 1733–34 (after noting that three prices in his simulation produced only a quarter 
of the deadweight loss caused by a single price, observing that “[t]hese results also imply that 
infinite price flexibility is not optimal”). 
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compensate the victim of the regulated parties’ actions. That is, if we 
assume that it is efficient to provide compensation for harms caused 
through some form of insurance (because people tend to be risk 
averse), there are efficiency gains that Galle’s analysis overlooks if the 
compensation arrangement can be designed so that it simultaneously 
produces ex ante regulatory incentives. Every dollar spent on 
accurately assessing how much the victim was harmed serves two 
functions: it serves an insurance function by determining how much 
the injured victim optimally should receive; and it serves a regulatory 
function by determining how much the injurer should have to pay. 
Having said all of that, I nevertheless concur with the general 
conclusion that, even where ex post incentive-based regulation is the 
most efficient regulatory tool, there is a decent case for adopting a 
system that produces somewhat less individually tailored sanctions 
(or damages) than does the traditional tort system in the United 
States. In setting up any system of regulation and compensation, 
there is an unavoidable tradeoff between adjudicative accuracy and 
administrative cost; and the U.S. tort system may well lean too far in 
the direction of the former at the expense of the latter.65 This 
conclusion is a primary justification for a number of alternative 
compensation regimes that have been adopted in various contexts, 
such as workers’ compensation regimes at the state level and the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program at the federal level.66 
Such alternative compensation schemes streamline the 
adjudicative process, and thereby lower administrative costs, by 
collecting claimants into groups (or clusters) based on a relatively 
simple set of characteristics (everyone with a particular category of 
injury gets a particular amount of compensation); they also provide 
greater certainty to regulated parties since the payment schedules for 
particular injuries are fixed. Such regimes, by reducing the highly 
individuated awards found in the traditional tort system, have a 
regulatory effect similar to what Galle is arguing for: more than a 
single price, but not “infinite price flexibility.” Moreover, such regimes 
could potentially be put to greater use than is currently the case in 
other areas of tort law, for example, with respect to the injury risks 
associated with autonomous vehicles.67 
 
 65.  Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994). 
 66.  See generally Hanson, Logue, & Zamore, supra note 9, at 536–44 (summarizing those 
programs). 
 67.  See, e.g., Kevin Funkhouser, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, Products 
Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437, 460–62 (discussing, as 
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I should also note that, even under current tort law, liability 
insurance produces an effect very similar to what I have just described 
and similar to what Galle is arguing for in terms of ex ante grouping 
into regulatory clusters. I discuss that phenomenon in the next Part. 
IV. THE ROLE OF MANDATORY LIABILITY INSURANCE 
As I (with others) have argued elsewhere, liability insurance, in 
addition to shifting and spreading risk, serves the function of 
converting the threat of ex post sanctions into ex ante premiums that 
roughly reflect the risks being insured.68 Moreover, liability insurance 
companies have an incentive to adjust their premiums to reflect the 
risks accurately. Why? Because if they fail to do so, they can lose 
customers to more aggressive insurers, or the insureds may opt to self 
insure. Liability insurance, then, can be understood as a form of 
private risk regulation with insurance premiums being, in effect, 
market-based, ex ante regulatory taxes.69 
There are limits, however, on the ability of insurance to 
regulate behavior. As Galle points out, insurers face various 
frictions.70 For example, some state regulators impose limitations on 
the prices that insurers can charge. Moreover, insurers suffer from 
externality problems of their own as an industry. For example, to the 
extent an insurer’s investments in risk-reduction technology benefits 
its competitors, there is a free-rider problem that undermines the 
incentive to make such investments.71 In general, the interests of 
insurance companies do not perfectly coincide with society’s interests. 
Their goal, after all, is to make a profit, not minimize risk. However, 
this profit motive does provide a motivation that government 
regulators do not have. Moreover, insurers, because of the nature of 
their business, have access to information that regulators typically 
lack.72 For these reasons, the combination of ex post government 
sanctions with liability insurance coverage (and the resulting 
 
alternative to traditional tort system for future market in driverless cars, a regime based on 
model of vaccine compensation regime). 
 68.  Hanson & Logue, supra note 27; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 54. 
 69.  See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 217 (2012). 
 70.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1739 (“The insurance industry . . . is not frictionless and 
perfectly informed.”). 
 71.  Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 69, at 229–31 (discussing externalities that might 
undermine insurers’ incentive to price risks in manner that is socially efficient from a deterrence 
perspective). 
 72.  Id. at 218–19.  
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differential, ex ante insurance premiums) seems like a promising 
alternative or supplement to ex ante government regulation. 
But liability insurance cannot serve this regulatory function in 
the presence of the judgment-proof problem, the problem of 
unsophisticated regulated parties, and the myopia problem discussed 
above, unless regulated parties are required to purchase coverage. The 
judgment-proof problem, for example, undermines the incentive to 
purchase liability insurance in the first place. Parties have little 
incentive to purchase liability insurance in excess of their assets, and 
we have the same problem if the risk of their activities is substantially 
greater than their assets.73 Moreover, if actors systematically 
underestimate certain risks, again perhaps because of their myopia, 
they may not be willing to pay the actuarially fair premium to 
purchase coverage. For these reasons, liability insurance can serve its 
regulatory function fully only if the government mandates coverage in 
amounts approximating the actual risk posed by the regulated 
activity.74 
Government mandates of liability insurance coverage are, of 
course, a form of ex ante regulation. But the ex ante regulation is 
limited to mandating the purchase of liability insurance. Under such a 
mandate, in contrast with the sort of ex ante, incentive-based 
regulation that Galle touts, it is insurance companies—as they 
compete for profits—that set the optimal, risk-reducing prices ex ante, 
rather than the regulator. If we believe that private insurance 
companies, because of their relatively superior access to accident-loss 
data and their profit motives, are better able to set such prices than 
government agencies, then mandatory liability insurance is a superior 
form of ex ante regulation—or combination of ex post and ex ante 
regulation—than the sort of purely agency-based price setting Galle 
prefers. 
Note also that liability insurance mandates would make 
insurance companies not only the private regulators of risk, but also 
the gatekeepers to the regulated activity in question. Some might 
regard this as unappealing or politically implausible. In situations in 
which no insurance company is willing to provide coverage for a 
particular activity for a particular insured, are we really prepared to 
treat that outcome as an outright ban on that party’s ability to engage 
in the activity? In the context of automobile insurance, which is one of 
the few areas in which we currently have mandatory liability 
insurance, the answer seems to be no. Indeed, most states create 
 
 73.  Shavell, supra note 46.  
 74.  Id. 
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special insurance pools to provide coverage for drivers that private 
markets are not willing to insure.75 
But perhaps the auto-insurance example suggests a way in 
which mandatory insurance can work together with ex ante 
government price setting.76 To the extent we believe that the outcome 
produced by mandatory liability insurance is too harsh—perhaps 
because there are beneficial externalities or distributive justice 
concerns that insurance markets do not take into account—direct, ex 
ante subsidies can be provided to make insurance affordable. This can 
be done while maintaining at least some of the marginal deterrent 
effect provided by premium differentials in liability insurance, which 
may be superior to an alternative that relies solely on ex ante 
government price setting. 
Still, the critiques described above do qualify the extent to 
which insurance can help overcome the judgment-proof problem, and 
to that extent they undermine the case for ex post regulation. How 
significant those critiques are in practice, however, is not clear. At 
least in circumstances in which the regulated parties are large 
commercial entities, whose assets are sufficient to cover most of the 
risks of their activities, ex post regulation may still be superior to ex 
ante regulation. Likewise, ex post regulation may be superior in those 
domains in which we are willing to mandate full liability insurance 
coverage or where parties, even in the absence of government 
mandates, tend to carry sizeable amounts of coverage for one reason or 
another.77 
 
 75.  For example, the California Assigned Risk Plan creates a “residual pool” of drivers who 
were not able to get coverage from private auto insurers in conventional markets.  The plan 
requires each auto insurer operating in California to take a share of those high risk drivers and 
provide them with coverage. See California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan, VALUEPENGUIN, 
http://www.valuepenguin.com/auto-insurance/california/assigned-risk-plan [https://perma.cc/ 
72L2-WFHQ] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (discussing California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan). 
Most states have such a plan. See Plan Sites, AIPSO, https://www.aipso.com/PlanSites.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6A6E-5LGA] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing links to states with auto 
assigned risk plans). 
 76.  Another prominent, and somewhat infamous, example of mandatory insurance can be 
found in the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, also known as the 
“individual mandate.” 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a) (“An applicable individual shall for each month 
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an 
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). In my 
view, however, that particular insurance mandate is better understood not as a regulatory 
provision designed to internalize costs, but rather as sort of revenue-raising tax designed to fund 
a public good. See Kyle D. Logue, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Individual Mandate: Thoughts on the 
Tax/Regulation Distinction (Univ. of Mich. Public Law Research Paper No. 498, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741471 [https://perma.cc/J433-L7WE]. 
 77.  Galle also expresses doubt that mandatory liability insurance would correct the 
judgment-proof or myopia problems. Galle, supra note 3, at 1746 (“In my view, the available 
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Finally, let’s return to Galle’s multi-price argument in favor of 
government ex ante price-setting over ex post regulation coupled with 
liability insurance mandates. Recall Galle’s argument that if 
government regulators can set regulatory prices at more than one 
price under ex ante government price-setting, they can produce more 
efficient regulatory incentives than can be produced either by a single 
industry-wide price or by the infinitely flexible pricing that 
characterizes the traditional tort system of ex post damages.78 They 
can cluster regulated parties into groups, according to their relative 
risks, and charge prices according to the mean of the group.79 This 
cluster pricing will produce most of the deterrent benefit of 
individualized pricing, which is the model of ex post regulation that 
Galle imagines, where courts set individualized ex post prices on all 
injury causing conduct—a result that Galle suggests is much more 
expensive than it is worth.80 
Here, I want to point out that such cluster pricing is precisely 
what insurance companies do, and they have been doing it for many 
years. When insurers underwrite risks, they gather information about 
clusters (they call them “pools”) of insureds who represent roughly 
similar liability risks, and then they charge everyone within the pool 
roughly the same premium. Moreover, insurers engage in exactly the 
sort of optimization strategy that Galle recommends, classifying risks 
only up to the point where the marginal benefits of doing so equals the 
marginal costs. Thus, liability insurers, as I’ve pointed out, function to 
convert ex post sanctions into ex ante regulations. The resulting set of 
prices approximates better than any real world example of an ex ante, 
 
evidence suggests that insurers would not, in fact, be able to effectively sensitize managers to 
future costs.”). His primary argument relies on the fact that commercial lenders do not currently 
take steps to encourage their borrowers to behave in ways that reduce the risk of large ex post 
judgments or fines, even though lenders are supposedly in the same economic position from a 
regulatory perspective as a liability insurer would be. Id. I disagree that lenders are in the same 
position as liability insurers. Lenders must take into account many different factors that play 
into the risk of nonpayment of a loan, including how well the company’s business is doing, how 
well the economy is doing, and so on. The possibility of a bankrupting tort case is a fairly small 
dot on the radar screen. For the liability insurer, however, their only job is to cover such cases, 
and their only interest, especially once they’ve collected the premium, is in reducing the risk of 
such tort claims. My research in his area suggests that insurers in fact do quite a bit to try to 
encourage their insureds to minimize their liability risk. See generally Ben-Shahar & Logue, 
supra note 54, at 199 (“This Article develops the claim that in a variety of areas private 
insurance companies can, and already do, replace or augment the standard setting and safety 
monitoring currently performed by government.”). 
 78.  Galle, supra note 3, at 1729–34. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
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Pigouvian tax—the sort of efficient, ex ante regulatory tax that Galle 
and many others envision. 
CONCLUSION 
The risks to life, health, and property that merit regulation 
present complex problems for which the best regulatory response is 
often not a single regulatory tool, but rather a combination of 
regulatory instruments. Among the regulatory instruments that can 
be effective is the ex post, incentive-based approach, which often takes 
the form of tort law or some other compensation-based regime or some 
other type of ex post government-imposed sanction. 
This type of regulation will be most useful, relative to ex ante 
forms of regulation, where either: (a) the regulated parties themselves 
are both solvent (or, at least, not judgment-proof) and relatively free 
from various cognitive and political biases, or (b) the regulated parties 
either voluntarily purchase full liability insurance or are mandated to 
purchase such coverage. In either situation, ex post regulation can 
harness private information and market forces to induce regulated 
parties to internalize costs that would otherwise be externalized. 
This is not to say that, even in these contexts, there is not room 
for ex ante government regulation beyond insurance mandates. In 
fact, there are situations where government access to information is 
simply better than that of even the largest, most sophisticated 
commercial actors. Moreover, there may be situations in which the 
private incentives of insurance companies and those of society more 
generally will diverge. Ex ante regulation obviously has an important 
role to play in those situations. 
 
